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Background:  During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
lockdown, contact clustering in social bubbles may allow extending 
contacts beyond the household at minimal additional risk and hence 
has been considered as part of modified lockdown policy or a gradual 
lockdown exit strategy. We estimated the impact of such strategies on 
epidemic and mortality risk using the UK as a case study. 
Methods:  We used an individual based model for a synthetic 
population similar to the UK, stratified into transmission risks from 
the community, within the household and from other households in 
the same social bubble. The base case considers a situation where 
non-essential shops and schools are closed, the secondary household 
attack rate is 20% and the initial reproduction number is 0.8. We 
simulate social bubble strategies (where two households form an 
exclusive pair) for households including children, for single occupancy 
households, and for all households. We test the sensitivity of results to 
a range of alternative model assumptions and parameters. 
Results:  Clustering contacts outside the household into exclusive 
bubbles is an effective strategy of increasing contacts while limiting 
the associated increase in epidemic risk. In the base case, social 
bubbles reduced fatalities by 42% compared to an unclustered 
increase of contacts. We find that if all households were to form social 
bubbles the reproduction number would likely increase to above the 
epidemic threshold of R=1. Strategies allowing households with young 
children or single occupancy households to form social bubbles 
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increased the reproduction number by less than 11%. The 
corresponding increase in mortality is proportional to the increase in 
the epidemic risk but is focussed in older adults irrespective of 
inclusion in social bubbles. 
Conclusions:  If managed appropriately, social bubbles can be an 
effective way of extending contacts beyond the household while 
limiting the increase in epidemic risk.
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Background
In the UK, similar to many other countries, the introduction 
of stringent physical distancing measures in March 2020 in 
response to the coronavirus disease 2018 (COVID-19) pandemic 
has reduced the transmission of severe acute respirator syndome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and alleviated the burden on 
the healthcare system1,2. However, this reduction has come at 
great economic, societal, and wider health costs3–6. As infec-
tion incidence has declined, countries have begun to ease restric-
tions in an attempt to reduce the societal and economic burden 
of lockdown. However, with infection incidence beginning to 
rise again in some countries, and with the spectre of a potential 
second epidemic wave in the Winter of 2020, countries must 
now strike a balance between easing restrictions and ensuring 
that the epidemic remains under control7–11.
Multiple options, that could in combination form an exit strat-
egy, have been proposed to allow easing of restrictions. These 
include: the widespread use of rapid, potentially app-based, con-
tact tracing in combination with rapid testing and self-isolation12,13; 
expanded random testing to increase detection of asympto-
matic infection14–16; strict quarantining of travellers on arrival17,18; 
and the use of face masks in high-risk environments19–22. 
Another potential component of a lockdown exit strategy that 
could allow for greater social interaction is the clustering of con-
tacts beyond the household, commonly referred to as the social 
bubble or the ‘double bubble’ strategy23–27. Under this strategy, 
households are allowed to form a cohesive unit with one other 
household, generating a ‘social bubble’; this allows individuals 
to increase their close, physical social interactions beyond 
their household while potentially limiting the risk of infection 
through the exclusivity of the bubble. A similar strategy has 
been implemented in some countries, including New Zealand 
and Germany, and is currently part of the lockdown exit 
strategy in the UK28. 
While physical distancing has placed additional pressures on 
society as a whole, some households are likely to be dispropor-
tionately more at risk of social isolation. Many adults in the 
UK will have been able to partially shift social contacts online 
and since 11th May (and 1st June) have been allowed to social-
ise outdoors with a maximum of one (and subsequently up 
to five) others while adhering to distancing guidelines29. 
However, such social contact replacements can be more difficult 
for children, for whom verbal interaction is only a small part of 
their communication with peers. Further, their carers have often 
had to balance working from home, childcare and homeschool-
ing, generally without being able to access a support network 
from family, friends or professional childminders30. Single 
occupancy and single parent households have also likely been 
disproportionately affected as the complete absence of social 
face-to-face interactions for many months may impact mental 
wellbeing31,32. To address this, households with one adult 
have been allowed to form a ‘support bubble’ with another 
household in England and Northern Ireland since 13th June33. 
Here, using mathematical models, we assess the likely increase 
in transmission generated by various plausible social bubble 
strategies and use the UK as a case study. In particular, we com-
pare the impact of limiting bubbles to those households who 
would benefit most (single occupancy households and those with 
young children) with allowing all households to form bubbles. 
We assess these changes in terms of both the increase in trans-
mission (as characterised by the reproductive ratio, R) and 
short-term increase in fatalities.
Methods
Population
The model’s synthetic population was created by generating 
individuals who are residents of one of 10,000 households. The 
size of the individual households, as well as the age distribu-
tion within households, was sampled to match that observed in 
the most recent census in England and Wales in 2011 (Figure 1)34.
We used data from the 2011 census of England and Wales to 
construct a distribution of age-stratified household composi-
tions in terms of 10-year age bands. Each household composi-
tion consisted of the number of individuals in each age band 
belonging to the household. We assigned probabilities to each 
composition observed in the census data based on the frequency 
of its appearance, and then used these probabilities to construct 
our simulated household population. This gave us a synthetic 
population whose age structure was comparable with that of 
England and Wales and whose household compositions reflected 
the observed correlations between the ages of household occu-
pants. In particular, this formulation should realistically capture 
the generational structure of households in England and Wales, 
which we expect to be an important factor in transmission 
across age classes.
Transmission model
The transmission dynamics are set to simulate the status of 
COVID-19 interventions during ‘lockdown’ in the UK in 
May 2020 or future lockdowns to mitigate a second wave, in 
particular simulating contacts that are substantially reduced 
and largely household-based, with schools, non-essential retail, 
and leisure facilities closed. This is achieved through stochas-
tic simulation of infections spreading through an intercon-
nected population by generation; connections are captured by a 
matrix, A, which defines the probability that infection can pass 
between any two individuals in the population over an indi-
vidual’s entire infectious period. A is composed of the sum of 
two matrices H and B, which capture within-household and 
within-bubble transmission respectively (Figure 1). We can 
          Amendments from Version 1
In this revised version we have responded to the comments 
made by both reviewers, and incorporated the suggestions 
each reviewer has made. In particular, we have now included 
density dependent transmission across close contacts as part 
of our sensitivity analysis, and we discuss in more detail our 
assumptions surrounding transmission, and the uncertainty that 
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then use the matrix A to drive forwards the stochastic dynamics 
using a next generation approach. To this, we add random 
(mean-field) transmission between individuals in the popula-
tion to simulate the risk that infection in the wider community 
poses to the household and the social bubble, and vice versa. 
Transmission rates within the household and the wider com-
munity are matched to observed data on secondary attack rates 
and population-scale R estimates. We assume that households 
are adhering to current restrictions and social distancing, and 
therefore largely act as a coherent and largely isolated unit. 
We therefore assume that the risk of a household acquiring 
infection from the community is independent of its number of 
occupants as observed in a cross-sectional serological study for 
SARS-CoV-2 in Germany in March and April 202035.
We assume that susceptibility to infection as well as transmis-
sibility of infection can be age dependent, hence transmission 
rates across contacts depend on the age of both individuals.. 
There are two conflicting bodies of evidence about the potential 
role of children. Firstly, it has been observed that children are 
more likely to experience mild or no symptoms, and as such may 
have a lower transmission rate36,37. Secondly, cases with more 
severe symptoms are likely to self-isolate reducing their effective 
infectious period, therefore children that are asymptomatic (or 
Figure 1. top panel: schematic of model structure and its stratification into different household sizes with three components 
of  transmission  dynamics,  community  transmission,  bubble  transmission  and  household  transmission;  left  panel: 
household size distribution for all households in England and Wales, for those households with at least one child younger than 
20-years-old and for those with at least one child younger than 10-years-old (about primary school age and younger). Right 
panel: illustrative transmission probability matrix A, composed of household and bubble contacts and including community transmission.
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mildly symptomatic) may continue to transmit for longer35. 
In our base parameterisation, we assume that children are 
50% as susceptible to infection as adults or elderly adults, but 
assume that transmissibility is independent of age; this echoes 
the assumptions of a previous model9, but an alternative 
parameterisation based on other work8 is considered as part of 
sensitivity analysis. We assume that transmission across close 
contacts (household or bubble) depends on the interaction 
between two individuals, and that the amount of ‘interaction’ an 
individual has with a close contact is inversely propor-
tional to the number of that type of close contacts that person 
has35,38,39. Under this assumption, transmission within house-
holds and across households who share a bubble is frequency 
dependent. 
Throughout, we compare the baseline model without the addi-
tional social interactions via bubbles (C1) with different ways 
in which bubbles could be allowed to form (scenarios 1–6, 
see below). To assess the effectiveness of social bubbles, com-
pared to increasing contacts in an unclustered fashion, we con-
sider two further comparison scenarios. In C2, individuals make 
the same number of infectious contacts with the population as 
in Scenario 6, but these are chosen randomly across the popula-
tion. In C3, individuals’ infectious contacts are resampled every 
generation. Scenario 6, C2, and C3 therefore represent fixed 
and clustered, fixed and unclustered, and variable additional 
contacts respectively.
Technical model summary
In this subsection we describe the model and its underlying 
assumptions in detail. Table 1 describes our notation, while 
Table 2 contains the formulae for transmission rates within our 
model. Key model parameters and assumptions are described 
below in Table 3.
Table 1. Model notation.
Symbol Meaning
C(i) Age-dependent susceptibility scaling factor of individual i
T(i) Age-dependent transmissibility scaling factor of individual i
NH(i) Number of individuals in an individual i’s household
τH Baseline transmission rate across household contact
ρH(i,j) Household transmission rate from individual j to individual i
τB Baseline transmission rate across bubble contact, τB = kτH where k ∈ [0 1]
ρB(i,j) Bubble transmission rate from individual j to individual i
ε Baseline mean-field transmission rate 
ε(i) Mean-field transmission rate to an individual i
Ig(i) Infection status of an individual i at generation g. 
Ig(i) = 0 if i is susceptible at generation g. 
Ig(i) = 1 if i has been infected by generation g (so includes recovered individuals)
Sg(i) 1 - Ig(i), i.e. the susceptibility status of an individual i at generation g.
N Size of population.
Table 2. Transmission rates.
Transmission rate Model formulation
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The expressions for household and bubble transmission rates 
are derived by assuming that transmission between close con-
tacts depends on frequency of interaction between those indi-
viduals. We decompose interaction between individuals i and 
j into interaction led by i and interaction led by j. The amount 
of interaction led by i (or j) depends on the number of other 
close contacts i (or j) has. The total amount of interaction, hence 
the rate of transmission, is given by summing these interactions. 
For household contacts i and j, both individuals have the same 
number of household contacts, hence leading to the above formula, 
equivalent to the standard frequency dependence of transmission 
assumption. Across bubble contacts, interaction depends on the 
size of both households. To obtain equations for density- 
dependent transmission, the dividing N
H
 terms are omitted 
from the equations for ρ
H
(i,j)  and ρ
B
(i,j).
Specific transmission rates also depend upon the transmissibil-
ity of the individual j transmitting infection (T(j)), and upon 
the susceptibility of the individual i receiving infection (C(i)), 
which are dependent on the age classes of individuals j and i.
The mean-field transmission to an individual, as well as an indi-
vidual’s contribution to mean-field infection, is inversely pro-
portional to the number of individuals in their household, as 
we assume that a household acts as a coherent and largely 
self-contained unit when interacting with the population at 
large. ε(i) also depends on the susceptibility of i, determined 
by their age class. The force of infection from the general 
population is given by 
1
1( )( ( ) ( )) ( ),j g g HT j I j I j N j
−
−−∑  i.e. 
the new infections in generation g, scaled by both the relative 
transmissibility of newly infected individuals and by their 
interaction with the general population determined by their 
household size.
By considering transmission as a Poisson process, we obtain 
the elements of the probability matrices H and B, the matrices 
of within household and within bubble transmissions respec-
tively, by taking H(i,j) = 1-e-⍴H(i,j) and B(i,j) = 1-e-⍴B(i,j). A non-zero 
element within the matrix H (or B) indicates that the corre-
sponding individuals are within the same household (or bub-
ble). We obtain the overall probability matrix for the population 
by taking A = H+B.
In order to simulate an epidemic, we begin by randomly 
sampling the probability matrix A. Doing so, we retain only the 
infectious connections between individuals that will lead to an 
infection. These sampled probability matrices therefore repre-
sent potential transmission networks (though the exact transmis-
sion network for a given simulation will depend  upon who is 
initially infected). Because these sampled matrices refer to trans-
mission events rather than contacts, this matrix may be unsym-
metric. We refer to the sampled matrix as A’. A’(i,j) = 1 denotes 
that individual j will infect individual i with probability 1, 
given individual j is infected. We initiate each simulation with the 
required number of infectious individuals for 1% of the popula-
tion to be infected by generation 4. Initially infected individuals 
are chosen with probability proportional to their mean-field inter-







Household structure and age 
distribution
34
τH 50% of the transmission rate for an 
adult, in a two person household
0.345 (20% 
SAR)




τB Transmission rate for an adult within 
the bubble
0.5 τH 1 τH  
0.1 τH
assumption
Relative transmissibility of a child and 
older adult vs adults
1 and 1 0.64 and 2.9 8,9
Relative susceptibility of a child and 
older adult vs adults
0.5 and 1 0.79 and 1.25 8,9
Infection fatality rate In 10y age 
bands
42
Re Net reproduction number 0.8 0.7, 0,9 43
ε Rate of infection from the community 1.13 (20% 
SAR)
1.29 (10% SAR) 
0.925 (40% SAR)
Calibrated 
to Re given τH
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Ig be the vector of infection statuses of individuals in generation 
g, we obtain the next generation by Ig+1 = sign((A’+Id) × Ig), 
where Id is the identity matrix, and where sign() is an ele-
ment-wise function equal to 1 for each positive element and 0 
otherwise. Via this matrix multiplication, every newly infected 
individual in generation g infects all of their infectious contacts 
that generation. Here the identity matrix is added to impose 
that individuals do not become susceptible again after one 
generation, while the sign function is used to impose that indi-
viduals cannot be infected more than once. This process can be 
iterated until equilibrium is reached, and the epidemic has ended. 
To this, we also add mean-field transmission. Each genera-
tion, the number of new infections is calculated in order to cal-
culate ε(i) for each susceptible individual i, who is infected from 
mean field transmission with probability 1 - eε(i) each generation.
Recovery from infection is not explicitly modelled in the 
simulation, but rather is implicitly built into the structure of the 
model. If an individual i is infected in generation g, they will 
infect all of their transmission contacts in generation g+1 via 
the matrix multiplication. They also only contribute to com-
munity infection in generation g+1. While individual i remains 
‘infected’ (with value 1), they no longer play any role in the 
infection dynamics, nor can they be reinfected. Hence, the simu-
lation model assumes that individuals are infectious for one 
generation, before recovering with immunity.
Results are averages obtained from simulations of 1000 
epidemics for 10 different sampled epidemic networks, hence 
results are averages of 10000 simulations.
Outcome metrics
We calculate two key metrics for the epidemiological impact 
of interventions in our household model with extended social 
contacts, which relate to epidemic risk and adverse health 
measures.
The net reproduction number (R) is a measure of risk of 
(increased) transmission that may eventually result in an exponen-
tial increase in infections and hence the need for stricter control 
measures if exceeding the epidemic threshold (R>1). R is defined 
as the number of secondary infections generated by a typical 
case. In models incorporating household structure, the typical 
case is effectively an average over the probability that such a 
case is the first, second, third or later generation case within the 
household44. Following the principle of Pellis et al.45,46, we deter-
mine R numerically as the ratio of the number of new infections 
in the fifth to the fourth model generation, adjusted to account 




( ) ( )
i g
i g i g
I i N
R g




we take R(4) as R. In all simulations this provided sufficient time 
for the average state of infectious individuals to have stabilised 
at a value that persists over several generations (Figure 2). 
Our second metric is the relative mortality (i.e. number of deaths), 
compared to the baseline model (C1) of isolated households; 
this provides a measure of adverse health impacts as a result of 
increased contact rates in the respective scenarios. We use age 
stratified infection fatality rates (IFR) estimated from repatria-
tion flights early in the COVID-19 pandemic42,47 to predict the 
mortality risk in the five generations following model burn 
in (i.e. from the fourth to ninth model generation - approxi-
mately the second month after social bubbles were initiated). 
Each simulation is initiated with the required number of infec-
tious individuals for 1% of the population to be infected 
by generation 4, in order for the fatalities following this 
generation to be meaningfully compared.
Parameterisation
To parameterise the COVID-19 transmission dynamics in 
the model we need to define the infection dynamics within a 
household, within a bubble and from the community. To param-
eterise the within household transmission we assume that, in 
line with observations from contact tracing while accounting for 
some underreporting40,41,48, the secondary household attack rate 
(SAR
HH
) is 20%. This is achieved by tuning the transmission rate 
Figure 2. Numerical exploration of R by generation. Left shows examples of the method for which ε was fitted to satisfy R(4) = 0.8 
under our baseline parameters for different values of SARHH. Right shows R(g) by generation from each of our scenarios from our baseline 
assumption. In both plots, R(g) decreases over the first few generations, before reaching an equilibrium value that persists over multiple 
generations.
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(τ
H
) between household members to achieve this average attack 
rate. We subsequently assume that community transmission 
is such that, in combination with household transmission, the 
model generates an overall reproduction number of 0.8, simi-
lar to estimates from mid-May 2020 in the UK43,49. Further, 
as a base-case, we assume that transmission between households 
within the same bubble is 50% lower than that within a house-
hold, i.e. τ
B
 = ½ * τ
H
. In our base case parameterisation a 
3.75-fold increase in community contacts yielded a reproduc-
tion number of about 2.5; this is in line with an approximate 70% 
reduction in contacts during lockdown and a reproduction 
number of about 2.5 in the early phase of the pandemic with 
hardly any distancing measures in place49.
We additionally assume that all eligible households would 
take up the opportunity to expand their contacts and enter 
into a social bubble with one other household, and that they 
would adhere to the exclusivity of this bubble. The impact of 
only partial uptake is explored in our results, and the impact 
of non-adherence, incorporated by allowing 50% of eligible 
households to form an additional social bubble, is explored in 
our sensitivity analyses 5
Model parameterisation
All analyses were done in MATLAB 2019B50 and R51 v3.6.3 
and are available via GitHub52. The R packages reshape2 v1.4.3, 
tidyverse v1.3.0 , and gridExtra v0.8.1 are required to generate 
plots. The analysis performed using MATLAB can be replicated 
using the open MATLAB compatible software GNU Octave, 
with minimal adjustments, outlined in the GitHub’s ReadMe52.
Scenarios modelled
We considered a number of contact clustering strategies of how 
bubbles could be allowed under any relaxation to lockdown 
measures:
1)    Allow households with children younger than 10-years-old 
(about primary school age or younger) to pair up
2)    Allow households with children younger than 20-years-old 
to pair up
3)    Allow single occupancy households to pair up with 
another single occupancy household
4)    Allow adults who live alone or with dependent children 
only to pair up with another household of any size in a 
‘support bubble’
5)    A combination of Scenarios 1 and 3
6)    Allow all households to pair up with one other household
All these scenarios assume that the pairing will occur at 
random between permitted households.
We compare the above scenarios against three counterfactuals 
that do not include social bubbles. These allows us to elucidate 
the impact of 
C1)    Perfect adherence to the current household-only con-
tact strategy (other than the background transmission 
risk from the community)
C2)    All individuals increase their number of contacts so 
that population level force of infection matches that 
of Scenario 6. Contacts are unclustered and chosen at 
random across the population but stay the same over 
time.
C3)    All individuals increase their number of contacts so 
that population level force of infection matches that 
of Scenario 6. Contacts are unclustered and chosen at 
random across the population and are re-sampled at 
each generation.
Counterfactuals 2 and 3, maintain the same level of additional 
contacts outside the home as social bubbles but change how 
they are distributed.
C2 is obtained by taking the sampled infectious contacts from 
Scenario 6, then rewiring these sampled contacts. Doing so 
keeps the number of secondary infections from any indi-
vidual constant across both scenarios. As the sampled con-
tact matrices represent transmission networks, edges may be 
either directed or undirected. Directed and undirected links are 
rewired separately, so that C2 has the same number of undi-
rected links (i would infect j and j would infect i) as in Scenario 
6. C3 is obtained, like in C2, by sampling infectious contacts 
from Scenario 6 then rewiring these sampled contacts. How-
ever, in this situation, all links are treated as directed, and hence 
the number of undirected links diminishes, reflecting that an 
individual chooses new bubble contacts each generation. This 
rewiring reflects that edges are resampled each generation. 
We also use this method to produce scenario specific counter-
factual scenarios, e.g. C2 and C3 for Scenario 1, to assess the 
effectiveness of bubbling.
Sensitivity analyses
Other than the previously described base case we performed a 
number of univariate sensitivity analyses to test the robustness 
of our findings to the underlying assumptions. Specifically, we 
assume that the current R is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.843; that the 
secondary attack rate in the household is 10% or 40% instead 
of 20%41; that transmission between individuals in the same 
bubble (but different households) is 10% or 100% of that within 
a household instead of 50%; that the risk of a household to 
get infected with SARS-CoV-2 from the community increases 
with increasing household size instead of being independent; 
that transmission across close contacts is density-depend-
ent instread of frequency-dependent; that 50% of bubbles do 
not adhere to the recommendations but also form bubbles with 
an additional household rather than perfect adherence; that 
households including an individual over 70-years-old do not 
form bubbles; and that the relative susceptibility to infec-
tion of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, 
respectively8,53.
We model non-adherence to the strategy by allowing 50% of 
eligible households to enter into close contact with an addi-
tional household. Doing so means that bubbles are no longer 
mutually exclusive, and that chains of transmission could poten-
tially span many households. Letting B
2 
denote the probability 
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matrix of additional bubbles through non-adherence, A is now 





From the 2011 census of England and Wales, the average size 
of a household was 2.36 persons. Considering households with 
at least one child under 10-years-old, the average household 
size increases to 3.89 persons, and 30.4% of the population 
live in such households. For households with at least one child 
under 20-years-old, the average household size is 3.73 persons, 
and 49.5% live in such households. In total, 37% of house-
holds are occupied by someone over the age of 60 years, and 
50% of single occupancy households were occupied by such 
older adults. Single occupancy households comprise 30.2% 
of households. There is limited multi-generational mixing, 
with only 3.6% of households having both a child aged under 
10 years and an adult aged over 60 years.
Impact of social bubble strategies on epidemic risk
Assuming an initial reproduction number of 0.8, perfect adher-
ence to the recommended social bubble strategy and that all eli-
gible households indeed pair up, we find that strategies that 
exclusively target single-person households (scenario 3) or 
households with young children (scenario 1) do not increase 
transmission substantially (R of 0.83 and 0.89 respectively in 
the base case scenario); their combination (scenario 5) is also 
predicted to only marginally increase transmission in the com-
munity (R of 0.91) (Figure 2). For these two targeted strategies, 
even under conservative assumptions (SAR
HH





the increase in transmission is unlikely to lead to substantial 
spread of COVID-19 (R of 0.95 and 0.91 for scenario 1 and 3, 
respectively).
However, allowing all households to form bubbles (scenario 
6) is estimated to increase the reproduction number to 1.02, 
and hence beyond the critical threshold value of 1 for the base 
case scenario (Figure 3).
Generally, the fewer households that were deemed eligible 
for expanding their social bubble under a specific strategy, the 
smaller the average household size of those involved. and the 
smaller the risk of transmission within the bubble, the smaller 
the increase in transmission as a result. The impact of social 
bubbles also depends on uptake - we find that R increases 
sublinearly with uptake (Figure 4).
Figure 3. Estimated reproduction number and increase in fatalities for the considered scenarios under the assumption that all 
eligible households pair up and thereby form exclusive social bubbles and that transmission rates within a social bubble are 
the same as within the household. Central estimates are assuming SARHH=20% and the upper and lower limits represent the respective 
10% and 40% assumption.
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The impact bubbles have on epidemic risk depends upon the 
levels of transmission within the population prior to intro-
ducing a bubble strategy. We find that the impact of bubble 
strategies on transmission scales linearly with the prior 
R value, but for some strategies with a gradient > 1, mean-
ing that the higher the level of community transmission within 
the population the larger the increase in R from allowing social 
bubbles (Figure 5).
The impact of social bubble strategies on mortality risk
The average age in the households eligible to form social 
bubbles in scenarios 1 to 6 was 21.8, 25.6, 58.1, 40.2, 32.2, 
and 39.4 years, hence the average infection fatality risk in an 
average household member implementing such a strategy was 
0.09%, 0.14%, 2.36%, 1.05%, 0.74%, and 0.93%. In all scenar-
ios, the increased number of contacts lead to both excess infec-
tions and fatalities. Excess risk for infection compared with no 
Figure 4. The impact of uptake on R and fatality. Here we consider the impact varying levels of uptake has on the reproduction number, 
R, and relative mortality. We consider this for our baseline parameters, at varying levels of transmission across bubble contacts (τB = τH in 
blue, τB= 0.5 τH in red, τB = 0.1 τH in green). We observe that R scales sublinearly with uptake, with the gradient of increase dependent on 
transmission rate across bubble contacts.
Figure 5. The relationship between initial R and R under different bubble scenarios. Here we consider the impact different bubble 
strategies have on the reproduction number, R. We consider this for our baseline parameters. For scenarios 3 to 6, we find that R with 
bubbles increases linearly with initial R with a gradient above 1, meaning that as initial R increases, the greater the increase bubble strategies 
have on R.
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social bubbles (Scenario C1) was seen in households implement-
ing the social bubbles as well as those households who were not 
eligible, although, as expected, the relative risk for infection 
was higher in eligible households (Figure 6). The resulting 
excess mortality risk depended highly on the estimated epidemic 
risk but also on the average age of the affected 
households.
For example, while social bubbles among households with 
young children (Scenario 1) saw the similar increases in infec-
tions to increases in deaths (with a risk ratio of 1.13 and 1.14 
for infections and deaths respectively), social bubbles target-
ing single occupancy households saw a larger increase in deaths 
than infections (with a risk ratio of 1.26 and 1.83 for infections 
and deaths respectively) due to the older targeted demographic. 
In scenarios targeting families, the mortality risk was largely 
attributed to households not eligible to form social bubbles 
(Figure 6).
Effectiveness of social bubbles
The forming of social bubbles was effective at reducing the 
infection and thereby the mortality risk compared to strategies 
that increased contacts in a less clustered way: under base case 
assumptions all households forming social bubbles (Scenario 
6) reduced the mortality risk by 30.9% and 42.4% compared to 
adding the same amount of contacts randomly (Scenario C2) 
and time varying (Scenario C3).
In general, the added benefit of social bubbles increases with 
the higher proportion of eligible households, alongside target-
ing riskier populations. For example, social bubbles for house-
holds with young children (Scenario 1) reduced mortality risk 
by 4.2% and 8.1% compared to those households increasing 
contacts randomly and time-varying. In contrast, allowing house-
holds with one adult to form a support bubble with another 
household (Scenario 4) results in 51% of the households enter-
ing into a bubble, and leads to a 27.7% and 39.3% reduced 
mortality risk compared to those households increasing their 
contacts randomly and time-varying respectively (Figure 7).
Sensitivity analyses
We tested the robustness of our findings to a number of alterna-
tive assumptions governing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and the 
implementation of the social bubble strategy. Within the tested 
parameter space, the alternative assumptions did not qualita-
tively change our findings. The two main factors that increased 
or decreased the epidemic risk were an initial value of R closer to 
1 when implementing the strategy and a much higher than typi-
cally observed secondary household attack rate. However, for 
Scenarios 1 and 3, in neither of the univariately tested param-
eterisations did R exceed 1 (Figure 8). The assumptions on age 
stratified susceptibility and transmissibility were conservative for 
strategies focussed on households with children and were 
optimistic for single-person households; and vice versa for 
the assumption that the risk for community transmission was 
independent of household size. The epidemic risk from social 
bubbles is further reduced if within bubble transmission is 
reduced to 10% of that within household transmission. The alter-
native assumptions surrounding close-contact transmission and 
community transmission changed the ordering of risk of social 
bubble strategies. Under our baseline assumption, Scenario 1, 
targeting families with young children, resulted in the lowest 
increase in R; under these alternative assumptions, Scenario 3, 
targeting single-occupancy households, resulted in the lowest 
increase in R. The corresponding tornado diagrams for all 
other scenarios are included as extended data52.
Figure 6. Relative risk of infection and fatality. Left panel: the relative risks for infection in the considered scenarios if compared to the 
status quo with no social bubbles (Scenario C1), stratified into the risks in households eligible and not eligible for forming social bubbles. 
Right panel: the population attributable fraction of fatalities in the considered scenarios. The overall mortality risk is stratified into the 
baseline risk, and the excess risk from forming social bubbles in both eligible and non eligible households.
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Figure  7. Scenario specific effectiveness of social bubbles. Here we compared the effectiveness of social bubbles in reducing 
mortality risk, when compared to other ways of increasing social contacts - where individuals from eligible households either make fixed 
random contacts (blue) or varying random contacts every generation (orange). In each comparison, individuals make the same number 
of infectious contacts, so the reduction in fatalities can be attributed to the clustering implied by social bubbles.
The effectiveness of social bubbles also varied according to 
the underlying parametric assumptions. Assuming our alter-
native assumptions around susceptibility and infectivity, the 
effectiveness of social bubbles was as large as a 46.1% and a 
58.5% reduction in mortality risk compared to adding the same 
amount of contacts randomly (Scenario C2) and time varying 
(Scenario C3). Under our most conservative assumptions, the 
reductions in mortality risk compared to C2 and C3 were 87.2 
and 91.3%.
Alongside the parameter sensitivity scenarios considered, we 
also considered each scenario where older adults were shielded 
and excluded from being allowed to form a bubble as a sen-
sitivity analysis. This only has a small impact on the effect of 
social bubbles for families with children (Scenarios 1 and 2), 
because of the small amount of multi-generational mixing 
between households in the UK, but does reduce R for social 
bubbles for single occupancy households or all households 
(Scenarios 3–6). While shielding older individuals does 
decrease overall mortality risk, such a strategy still impacts 
older individuals; bubbling strategies increase overall cases, 
which in turn increases risk to older individuals through 
community transmission.
Another potential strategy would be to allow all households 
with two or fewer adults to form a bubble with households of 
any size - an extension to the current situation in England. How-
ever, as 87.7% of households have two or fewer adults, such a 
policy would result in 98% of households forming bubbles, 
and hence such a policy would have largely the same impact as 
allowing all households to form bubbles.
Discussion
We found that contact clustering, or the forming of social 
bubbles that join two households, can allow increased social 
contacts beyond the households while limiting additional risk 
of transmission. In the base case social bubbles reduced the 
mortality risk by 42% compared to a scenario that increased 
contacts by the same amount but without clustering thereof, 
and risk reduction under some alternative parameterisations 
was even higher. Allowing all households to form social bub-
bles may increase R above its epidemic threshold and hence lead 
to an increase in cases. A strategy that sees only those at poten-
tially the highest need for an extension of their contacts beyond 
the household (families with young children and single-person 
households) should lead to a limited increase in epidemic risk 
(less than 11% individually and less than 15% in combination), 
which remained below the epidemic threshold in most scenar-
ios considered. The epidemic risk can be further reduced if the 
transmission risk within the bubble is minimised. As the number 
of contacts and R increase with a social bubble strategy, so 
does the risk of adverse health outcomes. We find that adverse 
health outcomes are largely proportional to the epidemic risk, 
but will disproportionately affect households with older adults 
independently of their clustering behaviour.
Stringent physical distancing policies in many countries have 
reduced R from about 2.5 to just under 111,49,54. This provides 
the opportunity to risk a small amount of additional contacts 
without necessarily experiencing an increase in COVID-19 
cases, if crossing the epidemic threshold can be avoided. Here, 
we investigate the effectiveness of social bubbles as a potential 
option to ease the social impact of the lockdown without increas-
ing transmission risks. However, while we consider the impact 
of social bubbles in isolation, such a policy would only be one 
part of a multi-variable exit strategy28. Hence, our comparisons 
of alternative bubble strategies against the epidemic threshold 
should be interpreted cautiously and in consideration of the other 
changes to behaviour, such as re-opening of non-essential retail 
and travel. It is likely that these other activities will combine 
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Figure 8. Sensitivity analyses. The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in fatalities and 
the net reproduction number for scenario 1 (above) i.e. allowing households with young children to pair up, and for scenario 3 (below), 
i.e. allowing single occupancy households to pair up. The color coding is based on factors determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk 
(blue) for Scenario 1. The base case estimate is indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are (from top to 
bottom): transmission across individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 50%; 
the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 125% while the relative transmissibility is 
64% and 290%; the secondary attack rate in the household is 10% or 40% instead of 20%; Re is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8; that households 
including an adult over 70-years-old are excluded from forming bubbles; density-dependent transmission across close contacts instead 
of frequency-dependent transmission; that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the recommendations but pair up with an additional 
household; and that the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead of being 
the same across households.
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in a non-linear manner so that bubbling in a context of 
children returning to school might affect results.
Countries including Germany and New Zealand have imple-
mented strategies similar to those considered here. In Bavaria, 
Germany, in early May and before the reopening of schools and 
nurseries, up to three households could form exclusive groups 
to share childcare amongst them55. Even during their highest 
national alert level, level 4 “Lockdown”, New Zealand permit-
ted people living alone to pair up with a “lockdown buddy” 
and key workers to identify “childcare buddies”. New Zealand 
moved to level 3 in their COVID-19 alert system, “Restrict”, 
on 27 April 2020, which included the advice to residents to 
stay within their household bubbles but permitted expansion 
of such to reconnect with close family, bring in caregivers or 
support isolated people56. A subsequent survey found that among 
respondents the highest increase in the quality of life by far 
would not be brought by re-opening of schools, shops, churches 
or fitness centres, but by allowing households to re-connect57. 
It also found that in going to alert level 3 only 50% of house-
holds took up the opportunity to expand their social bubbles 
and that there was high awareness of the importance of the 
exclusivity of the bubbles, with only 7.5% of bubbles reporting 
to have had contacts outside their bubble.
We identify three key risks to the success of social bubbles that 
may increase their epidemiological risk: potential lack of adher-
ence, a higher than observed secondary household attack 
rate and being too close to the epidemic threshold. If the risk 
perception of the population changes as a result of allowing parts 
of the population to form social clusters, a lack of adherence to 
the exclusivity of the bubbles could lead to rebuilding of con-
tact networks that in turn lead to the epidemic threshold being 
crossed. We find that some degree of non-adherence would not 
necessarily hinder the success of the strategy, but communication 
of the strategy is likely to be key. For example, in New Zealand, 
the social bubbles were not framed as a relaxation of social 
distancing rules but rather as a source of support for those who 
are at a higher risk of social isolation or with needs for care, 
including childcare57. We find that if the secondary household 
attack rate is substantially higher than assumed in our base case 
the epidemic risk is elevated close to the epidemic threshold. 
There remains some uncertainty surrounding the house-
hold attack rate of COVID-19, with high household attack 
rates observed in some instances. However, our base case 
assumptions are in line with an increasingly consistent pic-
ture emerging in the contemporary academic literature41. 
Also, superspreading events have been raised as a potentially 
important source for sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, 
which would further imply a rather low secondary household 
attack rate in most instances58,59. However, household attack 
rates may vary between different types of household, and may be 
larger for  some households with unusual network structures60, 
such as large student households. Similarly, if the R is very 
close to its epidemic threshold, an increase in contacts, even 
if clustered, could result in an increase in cases. Hence, care-
ful monitoring of such is needed to assess the feasibility of 
expanding social bubbles.
An expansion of contacts into social bubbles will naturally 
lead to some increase in transmission in comparison to perfect 
adherence to the recommendation to restrict to all but essen-
tial contacts outside the household. However, such adherence 
may decline as a result of extended periods of time in lockdown 
and lead to an expansion of contacts that are unclustered, 
potentially leading to long chains of transmission. To illus-
trate such a scenario, we include alternative comparisons for the 
strategy that allows all households to form social bubbles 
(Scenario 6). We considered strategies that would have the 
same overall increase in transmission as in that scenario but 
where either the contacts or not cluster but stay fixed over time 
(Scenario C2) or where contacts are not clustered and vary over 
time (Scenario C3). We show that the clustering reduces the 
epidemic and reduces the number of infections and subse-
quent fatalities by 30.9% and 42.4% in the base case and even 
more in some of the parametric sensitivity analysis. Hence 
social bubbles, if given as a guidance to households who are 
struggling to cope with the lockdown, may give these house-
holds a safer alternative and thereby help to reduce the epidemic 
and mortality risk. This may particularly be the case for house-
holds with single parents or parents who cannot easily work 
from home; in such circumstances allowing social bubbles 
may help increase equity in the impact of the lockdown.
As in any epidemiological modelling study, we must make 
some assumptions surrounding transmission. Firstly, we 
assumed that transmission across close contacts was frequency 
dependent, informed by previous studies that indicate the prob-
ability of infection across two specific members of the same 
household decreases with household size for COVID-19 (and 
other communicable diseases like influenza). However, there 
remains uncertainty surrounding the nature of close-contact 
transmission for COVID-19, and the assumption of frequency 
dependence may not accurately capture transmission across 
all settings. Secondly, we assumed that the risk of a household 
acquiring infection from the community is independent of its 
number of occupants. While this assumption may be appropri-
ate for some households (e.g. families where one adult leaves 
the household to do shopping), it may not hold true in other con-
texts (e.g. student households comprising of largely independ-
ent individuals). Because of this we tested the sensitivity of our 
results to these assumptions by alternatively considering close 
contact transmission as density dependent, and allowing the 
risk of household infection to increase with household size. 
These alternative assumptions do not qualitatively change 
our findings, but do change the ordering of the risk of social 
bubble strategies. In particular, under either of these alterna-
tive assumptions, social bubble strategies targeting single 
occupancy households result in a lower increase in R than strat-
egies targeting  families with children. Reports on the antibody 
prevalence in England found household size associated with 
antibody prevalence, suggesting that household size may play 
a role in the probability of acquiring infection61; a more detailed 
understanding of the nature of close contact and community 
transmission may help inform more precise evaluations of the 
effectiveness of social bubbles. We do not consider the risk 
of community transmission depending on bubble size. However, 
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if bubbles were to act as cohesive units, and as a consequence 
reduce their interaction with the community, this may further 
increase the effectiveness of social bubble strategies.
Our analyses have a number of limitations. Firstly, we only 
assessed the risk of extending social bubbles but not the benefits. 
As of June 2020 in England, social contact beyond the immedi-
ate household is restricted to virtual contact or contact in open 
spaces with up to five individuals while keeping 2 metres apart. 
In other words, one can have a conversation. While conversations 
are a large part of the social contacts of adults they have little role 
in the social interactions of young children. Hence the benefit of 
extending bubbles for children is likely disproportionately higher. 
Furthermore, clustering contacts into social bubbles is likely to 
ease contact tracing, which is an integral part of both contain-
ment and lockdown exit strategies. We considered social bubbles 
against the background of a lockdown, particularly where schools 
are closed. As lockdown measures are eased and schools are 
gradually re-opened forming social bubbles that largely overlap 
with societal contacts (e.g. forming social clusters with families 
that have children going to the same class) is likely further 
reducing the additional epidemic risk from social bubbles. By 
the same token, as lockdown eases, social bubbles aligned with 
other types of contacts, such workplace contacts or sport team 
contacts, would likely improve the efficacy of any bubbling 
strategy27. We also did not include the possibility to form big-
ger social bubbles that would cluster together three or more 
households. While this has been implemented in other coun-
tries, the complexity of creating an exclusive cluster of three or 
more households could lead to a loss of adherence. We did not 
consider further heterogeneity within society that may affect 
both risk of transmission and adverse health outcomes. For 
example, about 20% of the working population is classified 
as key workers and will have an increased risk for infection 
from the community, while adverse health outcomes have dis-
proportionately affected individuals of low socioeconomic 
status. Further, we did not consider age-homogeneous mix-
ing when pairing up households into bubbles, which may lead 
to a further layer of clustering and thereby reduce the mortality 
risks associated with the bubble strategy.
Conclusions
Our analyses highlight the continued need for social distancing 
despite a social bubble strategy being an effective way to 
expand contacts while limiting the risk of a resurgence of 
cases. Recommending social bubbles only for those who 
particularly struggle with a lockdown, while minimising oppor-
tunities for spread through prioritising outdoor settings for gath-
erings and adhering to distancing recommendations as much as 
possible, may strike an effective balance between minimising 
the impact on mental health and minimising the risk of a resur-
gence of cases. With the increased number of local lockdowns 
and the risk of a second wave in the Winter of 2020, social bub-
bles may again become a vital tool to provide social interactions 
to those that need it most whilst keeping R below one.
Data availability
Source data
The synthetic population for the study was constructed by from 
the 2011 (27 March) census, from the table ‘SN 8637 - 2011 
Census Ad Hoc Household Composition (Age Groups) Safeguarded 
Tables (Lower Layer Super Output Area): England and Wales. 
This table is safeguarded, and can only be accessed by approved 
researchers. However, we have included our synthetic population 
in our repository as a Matlab workspace, ‘FullCensusHouse-
holdWorkspace.mat’, which can be used to regenerate results 
and to derive population level statistics. Alternatively, Office for 
National Statistics data for the age distribution of households 
in ten year age bands containing six individuals or fewer are 
available as dataset CT1088, (https://www.ons.gov.uk/search?:
uri=search&:uri=search&q=CT1088*). Households of size six or 
less account for 98.2% of the households in England and Wales, 
and contain 97.8% of their combined population, so the loss 
accuracy induced by this cutoff is likely to be minimal.
Underlying data
The simulation model and analyses from this study are available 
via GitHub https://github.com/tsleng93/SocialBubble/tree/v1.1
Archived code at time of publication: http://doi.org/10.5281/ 
zenodo.460547552
To generate the underlying data for the plots in Figures 3, 8, and 
the extended data, users should run the code ‘MainCode.m’. 
After running this, users should then run ‘DataMaker.m’ to 
produce the underlying .csv files.
To generate the underlying data52 for the plots in Figure 6, users 
should run the code ‘figure6Code.m’, which runs the code 
and produces the underlying .csv files.
The R code ‘plots.r’ can be run as it is in order to generate the 
exact plots of Figures 1, 3, 6, 8 and the extended data52. To gen-
erate analogous plots from regenerated data, the .csv files should 
be replaced with those generated from ‘MainCode.m’ and 
‘figure7Code.m’
To generate the data and plots for Figure 2, Figure 4, Figure 5, 
and Figure 6 users should run the code ‘figure2Code.m’, 
‘figure4Code.m’, etc.
Extended data
Zenodo: tsleng93/SocialBubble: SocialBubble. http://doi.org/ 
10.5281/zenodo.401370252
This project contains the following extended data:
-    main_tornado_Scenario_2.pdf (univariate sensitivity 
analysis for Scenario 2)
-    main_tornado_Scenario_4.pdf (univariate sensitivity 
analysis for Scenario 4)
-    main_tornado_Scenario_5.pdf (univariate sensitivity 
analysis for Scenario 5)
-    main_tornado_Scenario_6.pdf (univariate sensitivity 
analysis for Scenario 6)
-    main_tornado_Scenario_C2.pdf (univariate sensitivity 
analysis for Scenario C2)
-    main_tornado_Scenario_C3.pdf (univariate sensitivity 
analysis for Scenario C3)
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The authors have developed a model with which they can investigate what the effect is if two 
household are allowed to form a bubble. The authors analyse this for different groups of 
households which are allowed to form bubbles and compare this to scenarios without bubbles 
and if the additional contacts do not occur in bubbles but randomly. 
 
I think the models are suitable for the research question. As the code is provided by the 
researchers. the results can be replicated and other research questions could be addressed by the 
model as well. 
 
I have only minor points, mainly things that could be clarified to make it easier for readers to 
understand the methodology. 
 
On page 3 “connections are captured by a matrix, A, which defines the probability 
that infection can pass between any two individuals in the population. A”. I think that the authors 
should specify what the nature of this probability is and that the model uses generations and that 
the probabilities refer to probabilities of transmission during the infectious period (and not a 
probability per day, for example). 
 
I was surprised by the assumption “transmission within households and across households who 
share a bubble is frequency dependent.” And wondered whether it would be reasonably to 
perform a sensitivity analysis to this (assuming a density dependent transmission rate), as the risk 
of transmission within a household and in bubbles in some cases, say sitting around one table, 
may not be frequency dependent. 
 
In table 1: regarding ρH(i,j) specify what the unit of time is for the rate (duration infectious period). 
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dependent sensitivity. 
 
In Table 2, check the use of \tau and T 
 
 The authors claim to have performed a sensitivity analysis for the case “that the risk of a 
household to get infected with SARS-CoV-2 from the community increases with increasing 
household size instead of being independent”. I did not see the results in the manuscript or the 
online-material. Did I miss this?
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We thank both reviewers for their considered and detailed reviews of our manuscript. We 
respond to each of the points raised by reviewers below, and have also revised the main 
body 
of the manuscript where appropriate. 
 
Reviewer 2:
Comment:  On page 3 “connections are captured by a matrix, A, which defines the 
probability that infection can pass between any two individuals in the population. A”. I 
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think that the authors should specify what the nature of this probability is and that 
the model uses generations and that the probabilities refer to probabilities of 
transmission during the infectious period (and not a probability per day, for 
example). 
Response:  We agree that this should be clarified. We have amended the above 
sentence to (added text in bold:) 
 
“This is achieved through stochastic simulation of infections spreading through an 
interconnected population by generation ; connections are captured by a matrix, A, 
which defines the probability that infection can pass between any two individuals in 
the population over an individual’s entire infectious period .”
Comment:  I was surprised by the assumption “transmission within households and 
across households who share a bubble is frequency dependent.” And wondered 
whether it would be reasonably to perform a sensitivity analysis to this (assuming a 
density dependent transmission rate), as the risk of transmission within a household 
and in bubbles in some cases, say sitting around one table, may not be frequency 
dependent.
○
Response: Our decision to assume frequency-dependent transmission for close 
contacts was based upon studies indicating that the probability of infection across 
two specific members of the same household decreases with household size for 
COVID-19 (and other communicable diseases like influenza). However, we 
acknowledge that for COVID-19 the nature of within-household transmission remains 
relatively uncertain, and that whether transmission within households is frequency or 
density dependent may depend on the specific context of the household. We have 
performed this sensitivity analysis - finding that the assumption of density-
dependence does not qualitatively change our results (although does change the 
ordering of scenarios - with density dependent transmission, scenario 3 (single-
occupancy household bubbles) now results 
in the smallest increase in R. We have adjusted the text in the methods, the results 
(Figure 8), and the discussion to indicate we have considered density-dependent 
transmission. The added text in the discussion is included in bold below: 
 
“As in any epidemiological modelling study, we must make some assumptions 
surrounding transmission. Firstly, we assumed that transmission across close 
contacts was frequency dependent, informed by previous studies that indicate 
the probability of infection across two specific members of the same household 
decreases with household size for COVID-19 (and other communicable diseases 
like influenza). However, there remains uncertainty surrounding the nature of 
close-contact transmission for COVID-19, and the assumption of frequency 
dependence may not accurately capture transmission across all settings. 
Secondly, we assumed that the risk of a household acquiring infection from the 
community is independent of its number of occupants. While this assumption 
may be appropriate for some households (e.g. families where one adult leaves 
the household to do shopping), it may not hold true in other contexts (e.g. 
student households comprising of largely independent individuals).. Because of 
this we tested the sensitivity of our results to these assumptions by 
alternatively considering close contact transmission as density dependent, and 
○
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allowing the 
risk of household infection to increase with household size. These alternative 
assumptions do not qualitatively change our findings, but do change the 
ordering of the risk of social bubble strategies. In particular, under either of 
these alternative assumptions, social bubble strategies targeting single 
occupancy households result in a lower increase in R than strategies targeting 
families with children. Reports on the antibody prevalence in England found 
household size associated with antibody prevalence, suggesting that household 
size may play a role in the probability of acquiring infection; a more detailed 
understanding of the 
nature of close contact and community transmission may help inform more 
precise evaluations of the effectiveness of social bubbles.” 
 
Comment:  The authors may consider to use a different symbol than C which already 
in use as the age dependent sensitivity. 
Response: Thanks for this suggestion. We have changed C in row 6 of table 1 to k. 
 
○
Comment:  In Table 2, check the use of \tau and T 
Response:  We apologise for this typesetting error. Capital T should refer to the 
transmissibility of an individual i, whereas transmission rates should be τ’s - this has 




Comment:  The authors claim to have performed a sensitivity analysis for the case 
“that the risk of a household to get infected with SARS-CoV-2 from the community 
increases with increasing household size instead of being independent 
Response:  This appears as the ‘Community transmission’ row of the tornado 
diagrams of the sensitivity analyses. We now discuss the sensitivity analyses that 
change the ordering of scenarios (the alternative assumptions surrounding 
community transmission 
and density dependent transmission) in Results subsection ‘sensitivity analyses' 
(added text in bold:) 
 
“The alternative assumptions surrounding close-contact transmission and 
community transmission changed the ordering of risk of social bubble 
strategies. 
Under our baseline assumption, Scenario 1, targeting families with young 
children, resulted in the lowest increase in R; under these alternative 
assumptions, Scenario 3, targeting single-occupancy households, resulted in the 
lowest increase in R.”
○
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Jessica Enright   
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK 
This paper describes a careful consideration of the potential for between-household social 
bubbling to contribute to Covid-19 control during the current (2020) pandemic. The main narrative 
comparison is between a lockdown scenario where most contact is within a household as 
compared to several different bubbling arrangements, but a variety of scenarios are considered 
beyond bubbling to assess bubbling efficacy. The authors conclude that within their modelling 
framework a variety of bubbling arrangements would feasibly keep the reproductive number 
below 1 (thus preventing exponential growth of infections). This is a valuable piece of work that I 
hope has contributed to the evidence for policymaking during emergence from lockdown after the 
first wave of the pandemic in the UK. To my understanding, a scenario closest to Scenario 4 is 
what was actually implemented within most of the UK.   
 
The authors have done a good job of incorporating the available knowledge about the 
epidemiology of Covid-19 at the time they wrote this paper. Given the pace of developments it 
would have been impossible to incorporate all emerging information, and certainly more 
knowledge has emerged since the publication of this work that interacts with the work and 
conclusions here - I don’t think it would be fair to request the authors try to incorporate these 
subsequent developments.   
 
To my best understanding, the model is based on a generation matrix combining household and 
bubble contacts that is subsampled using transmission probabilities to give contacts that would 
result in infection. In addition there is mean-field infection across the population. Parameters are 
from a combination of published sources, adjustments to produce observed R values, and values 
chosen for sensitivity analysis.    
 
The counterfactual approach to comparison in which the number of infectious contacts are 
maintained but are rewired outside of bubbles or households in C2 and C3 is useful, and it is 
unsurprising that these counterfactuals results in more overall infection. I was initially slightly 
puzzled by the use of directed edges here (given that a single contact could transmit in either 
direction), but on reflection it makes sense in the context of the subsampling of the matrix to give 
essentially a transmission network rather than a contact network. The authors may wish to include 
a sentence or two clarifying this choice.   
 
I would also have been interested in seeing an analysis of bubbling value in a setting with a 
steadily increasing mean-field risk of transmission, as an attempt to model a general opening-up 
and increase in activity. However, I realise this is beyond the scope of this work, and I note that the 
authors discuss this in the Discussion, noting the likelihood of a ‘multi-variable exit strategy’ in 
which bubbles might combine with other restriction easements.   
 
I wanted to highlight an assumption that I think is important for this model, and that may not 
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apply in all situations: the idea that “We therefore assume that the risk of a household acquiring 
infection from the community is independent of its number of occupants”. While I think this is 
well-supported by citations and is appropriate within the setting considered here, I just wanted to 
highlight that this may not hold true in larger households composed of multiple unrelated adults - 
e.g. in student households.  In the REACT-2 reports of antibody prevalence 
(https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.08.12.20173690v21) after several months of the 
pandemic in England, individuals in larger households were more likely to have antibodies - of 
course this could also be potentially explained by a fixed within-household SAR regardless of 
household size, and the many risk-factors captured within REACT-2 correlated with living in a large 
household. The authors include a violation of this assumption in the sensitivity analyses, and if I 
have understood correctly it doesn’t qualitatively change the findings. I also found it interesting 
that the authors chose to have the mean-field transmission depend on an individual’s household 
size, but not on bubble size - would we expect bubble interactions to decrease interactions in the 
community that would contribute to the general spread modelled as mean-field here? Am I correct 
in thinking that moderating the mean-field transmission including bubble size would have 
increased the efficacy of bubbles? 
 
The authors note that the epidemic risk was sensitive to a much higher than observed secondary 
attack rate within a household - I wanted to note that this parameter is still somewhat uncertain, 
though their estimate is very reasonably based in observation. Again (and this does not detract 
from the application of this work to a general population), this may differ in very unusual e.g. large 
young-adult student households due to differing network effects within the household (for 
example, as described in https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rssc.120112). 
 
There are many possible extensions to this work that could take it beyond the emerging-from-
lockdown scenario - the authors mention that in the case of schools being open bubbles might be 
most effective if they aligned with those school contacts, and presumably that would also hold for 
other types of contacts (work, sport, etc.). It may also be worth considering bubbles as an option 
during second-wave restrictions, but with the important warning that the authors found that their 
model outcomes were sensitive to higher R values at the point of implementation of the strategy.   
 
I was pleased to see that the code associated with this work is all available online and is nicely 
organised, reasonably documented, and CC0 licensed, making the results reproducible and the 
work re-usable.   
 
I have a few smaller queries around possible typesetting errors:
In the section ‘Sensitivity Analysis’ the following appears: “1when” - likely a missing space? 
 
○
In the section ‘Sensitivity Analysis’ the following appears: “underlying. parametric 
assumptions” -  likely an extra full-stop? 
 
○
I have some confusion around the typesetting or naming of variables in expressions in 
Table 2: 
 
In the ‘Bubble’ transmission rate, we see something that looks like τB, but I think that 
this does not appear in Table 1 - does it correspond to TB in Table 1? 
 
○
Similarly in the ‘Household’ transmission rate, I see ϲ(i) and τH - do these correspond ○
○
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to Ϲ(i) and TH in Table 1? 
 
I think that the susceptibility term defined in Table 1 might not appear elsewhere, 
though it is mentioned in words - I could of course have missed it! If it does not 
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respond to each of the points raised by reviewers below, and have also revised the main 
body 
of the manuscript where appropriate. 
 
Reviewer 1:
Comment: I was initially slightly puzzled by the use of directed edges here (given that 
a single contact could transmit in either direction), but on reflection it makes sense in 
the context of the subsampling of the matrix to give essentially a transmission 
network rather than a contact network. The authors may wish to include a sentence 
or two clarifying this choice. 
Response: Thank you for highlighting this. We have now clarified this in the main 
body of the test, adding in the sentences in bold: 
 
“Doing so, we retain only the infectious connections between individuals that will lead 
to an infection. These sampled probability matrices therefore represent potential 
transmission networks (though the exact transmission network for a given
simulation will depend upon who is initially infected). Because these sampled 





“C2 is obtained by taking the sampled infectious contacts from Scenario 6, then 
rewiring these sampled contacts.Doing so keeps the number of secondary infections 
from any individual constant across both scenarios.  As the sampled contact 




Comment:  I would also have been interested in seeing an analysis of bubbling value 
in a setting with a steadily increasing mean-field risk of transmission, as an attempt 
to model a general opening-up and increase in activity. However, I realise this is 
beyond the scope of this work, and I note that the authors discuss this in the 
Discussion, noting the likelihood of a ‘multi-variable exit strategy’ in which bubbles 
might combine with other 
restriction easements. 
Response: We agree that such an analysis is beyond the scope of this current work. 
However, we believe that Figure 5 provides some intuition as to what would happen 
in such a setting. Figure 5 shows that bubbling scenarios cause an approximately 
constant increase to  R, demonstrating that over the range of mean-field 
transmissions considered in Figure 5 bubble strategies have a similar impact on R. 
 
○
Comment:  I wanted to highlight an assumption that I think is important for this 
model, and that may not apply in all situations: the idea that “We therefore assume 
that the risk of a household acquiring infection from the community is independent 
of its number of occupants”. While I think this is well-supported by citations and is 
appropriate within the setting considered here, I just wanted to highlight that this 
may not hold true in larger 
○
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households composed of multiple unrelated adults - e.g. in student households. In 
the REACT-2 reports of antibody prevalence 
(https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.08.12.20173690v21) after several 
months of the pandemic in England, individuals in larger households were more likely 
to have antibodies - of course this could also be potentially explained by a fixed 
within-household SAR regardless of household size, and the many risk-factors 
captured within REACT-2 correlated with living in a large household. The authors 
include a 
violation of this assumption in the sensitivity analyses, and if I have understood 
correctly it doesn’t qualitatively change the findings. 
Response: Thank you for highlighting this. We have updated our discussion to 
highlight that the assumption of external infection being independent of household 
size may not apply to all contexts, and have included the suggested reference. In our 
sensitivity analyses we consider the situation where a household’s probability of 
acquiring infection from the community scales with household size. This does not 
qualitatively change our findings, but does impact on the order of which bubbling 
scenario results in the smallest increase in R (for example, Scenario 3 now results in 
the smallest increase in  R  , as 
Scenario 3 focuses on single-occupancy households). In reality, the risk of external 
infection to a household is probably between these two extremes, and may vary from 
household to household. We have also included a fixed within-household SAR 
regardless of household size (i.e. density dependent transmission) in our sensitivity 
analysis. Again, this does not qualitatively change our results, but does impact the 
ordering of scenarios. (Added text in bold below:) 
 
“As in any epidemiological modelling study, we must make some assumptions 
surrounding transmission. Firstly, we assumed that transmission across close 
contacts was frequency dependent, informed by previous studies that indicate 
the probability of infection across two specific members of the same household 
decreases with household size for COVID-19 (and other communicable diseases 
like influenza). However, there remains uncertainty surrounding the nature of 
close-contact transmission for COVID-19, and the assumption of frequency 
dependence may not accurately capture transmission across all settings. 
Secondly, we assumed that the risk of a household acquiring infection from the 
community is independent of its number of occupants. While this assumption 
may be appropriate for some households (e.g. families where one adult leaves 
the household to do shopping), it may not hold true in other contexts (e.g. 
student households comprising of largely independent individuals).. Because of 
this we tested the sensitivity of our results to these assumptions by 
alternatively considering close contact transmission as density dependent, and 
allowing the risk of household infection to increase with household size. These 
alternative assumptions do not qualitatively change our findings, but do change 
the ordering of the risk of social bubble strategies. In particular, under either of 
these alternative assumptions, social bubble strategies targeting single 
occupancy households result in a lower increase in R than strategies targeting 
families with children. Reports on the antibody prevalence in England found 
household size associated with antibody prevalence, suggesting that household 
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size may play a role in the probability of acquiring infection; a more detailed 
understanding of the nature of close contact and community transmission may 
help inform more precise evaluations of the effectiveness of social bubbles.” 
 
Comment: I also found it interesting that the authors chose to have the mean-field 
transmission depend on an individual’s household size, but not on bubble size would 
we expect bubble interactions to decrease interactions in the community that would 
contribute to the general spread modelled as mean-field here? Am I correct in 
thinking that moderating the mean-field transmission including bubble size would 
have increased the efficacy of bubbles? 
Response: We chose to focus on scenarios where implementing bubble strategies 
would strictly increase transmission. If a household’s mean-field transmission 
depends on the size of their bubble, the introduction of a social bubble strategy may 
in some instances decrease transmission (the increase in within-bubble transmission 
may be less than the decrease in community infection). You are correct in saying that 
this would have increased the efficacy of bubbles, and we have now noted this in the 
discussion (added text in bold below): 
 
“We do not consider the risk of community transmission depending on bubble 
size. However, if bubbles were to act as cohesive units, and as a consequence 
reduce their interaction with the community, this may further increase the 
effectiveness of social bubble strategies.” 
 
○
Comment:  The authors note that the epidemic risk was sensitive to a much higher 
than observed secondary attack rate within a household - I wanted to note that this 
parameter is still somewhat uncertain, though their estimate is very reasonably 
based in observation. Again (and this does not detract from the application of this 
work to a general population), this may differ in very unusual e.g. large young-adult 
student households due to differing network effects within the household (for 
example, as described in https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rssc.120112) 
Response: Thank you for highlighting this. We have updated our discussion to 
highlight 
the uncertainty that remains in determining this parameter, and the heterogeneity in 
attack rates that may occur in different settings. (Added text in bold below): 
 
“There remains some uncertainty surrounding the household attack rate of 
COVID-19, with high household attack rates observed in some instances. However, 
our base case assumptions are in line with an increasingly consistent picture 
emerging in the contemporary academic literature. Also, superspreading events have 
been raised as apotentially important source for sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-
2, which would 
further imply a rather low secondary household attack rate in most instances. 
However, 
household attack rates may vary between different types of household, and 
may be larger for some households with unusual network structures, such as 
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Comment:  There are many possible extensions to this work that could take it beyond 
the emerging-from lockdown scenario - the authors mention that in the case of 
schools being open bubbles might be most effective if they aligned with those school 
contacts, and presumably that would also hold for other types of contacts (work, 
sport, etc.). It may also be worth considering bubbles as an option during second-
wave restrictions, but with 
the important warning that the authors found that their model outcomes were 
sensitive to higher R values at the point of implementation of the strategy. 
Response:  We have included in the discussion that social bubbles aligned with other 
types of contacts, such as sport or workplace, would likely improve the efficacy of any 
bubbling strategy (Added text in bold below): 
 
“As lockdown measures are eased and schools are gradually re-opened forming 
social bubbles that largely overlap with societal contacts one (e.g. forming social 
clusters with families that have children going to the same class) is likely further 
reducing the additional epidemic risk from social bubbles. By the same token, as 
lockdown eases, 
social bubbles aligned with other types of contacts, such workplace contacts or 




Comment: In the section ‘Sensitivity Analysis’ the following appears: “1when” - likely a 
missing space? 
Response:  This has now been amended.
○
Comment:  In the section ‘Sensitivity Analysis’ the following appears: “underlying. 
parametric assumptions” - likely an extra full-stop? 
Response: This has now been amended.
○
Comment:  In the ‘Bubble’ transmission rate, we see something that looks like τ B , 
but I think that this does not appear in Table 1 - does it correspond to T B in Table 1? 
Similarly in the ‘Household’ transmission rate, I see c(i) and τ H - do these correspond 
to C(i) and T H in Table 1? 
Response: We apologise for the typesetting errors in notation. The correct notation 
for household and transmission rates is τ H and τ B , and the correct notation the 
susceptibility scaling factor is C(i). Tables have been amended and now notation is 
applied consistently throughout the paper.
○
Comment:  I think that the susceptibility term defined in Table 1 might not appear 
elsewhere, though it is mentioned in words - I could of course have missed it! If it 
does not appear, should it? If not, the authors might consider removing it from Table 
1? 
Response:  The susceptibility term appears in the equation for R(g)
○
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